











Do you believe in spirits?  Most of us would want to reply:  ‘It depends on what you mean ...’ 
This is the problem with many words used in religion or theology.  They seem to signify 
something important, but they have no clear edges, no sharp definitions against which we 
can measure our beliefs and say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ about them. 
 
Pioneer anthropologist Edward Tylor, writing last century, chose as his minimum definition 
of religion ‘the belief in Spiritual Beings’.  He offered a theory called Animism, from the Latin 
anima or spirit. According to this theory, religions arise out of beliefs about an invisible 
world of spirits or powers, non-human or super-human intelligences.  At the simplest level, 
such spirit-beings are insubstantial ghosts, dreams or apparitions – but, amplified through 
fear and desire to placate or find favour, spirits grow in importance in people’s minds until 
eventually they become divinities: gods if good, demons if evil. 
 
Now Tylor’s theory of Animism was based on the ‘primitive culture’ (as he called it) of tribal 
peoples. Yet the theory seems to fit any faith in which there are invisible agencies or 
supernatural beings conceived of in personal form, capable of interacting with humans:  
dead who live on in an after-life, saints who watch over the faithful, devils who tempt, 
angels who convey messages, a supreme Lord or Saviour who redeems and guides the 
community of believers, a God or Gods who created the world and continue to transcend 
time and history. Spirits great and small are not confined to so-called primal or tribal 
cultures but feature in almost all the world’s faiths. 
 
Thus modern-day Jews, Christians and Muslims, Sikhs, Baha’is and Rastafarians can all be 
said to be animistic for they all believe there is a God who is the Supreme Spiritual Being (in 
the case of Christians a trinity of three distinct persons) along with subordinate supernatural 
creatures such as angels, satanic and evil powers, as well as holy prophets, apostles, saints 
and other ‘saved’ humans who live on after their earthly lives. Hindus, too, are animistic, 
with countless divinities (male and female) populating their spirit-world. And even 
Buddhists, though they hold no Divine Spirit to be the creator, attach great significance to 
beneficent spiritual beings such as Bodhisattvas, and malicious ones like Mara and his 
demons.  Animism or ‘belief in spiritual beings’ as a definition of religion, then, goes a long 
way towards covering the major world faiths, even today. 
 
 
Religion as Animism/Anthropomorphism 
In his recent book Faces in the Clouds the American anthropologist Stewart E. Guthrie has 
revived Tylor’s classic view of religion as belief in spiritual beings, adding an original angle 
designed to make the animistic theory more convincing in a modern context.  
‘Anthropomorphism’ – that is, animating the world and attributing human characteristics to 
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non-human things or events – is ‘familiar, pervasive, and powerful in human thought and 
action’ (Guthrie 1993: 3). 
 
Guthrie provides a wealth of evidence of anthropomorphism from within our everyday lives.  
The language we use, for instance, is rich in animistic and humanising metaphors. We 
regularly address and talk to non-human things: not only to our pet animals but to our 
diaries, cars, computers. We blame hard objects for the injuries they cause us, swear at 
appliances that let us down, plead with tools and machines to co-operate with our wishes.  
We personalise our natural environment endlessly in our art and poetry.  Our liking for user-
friendly objects, implements and containers is constantly exploited in advertising and 
marketing.  Our very perceptions, as developmental psychology and cognitive science show, 
are shaped by person-derived categories and governed throughout by human needs and 
interests. 
 
Rather than apologising for all this anthropomorphising as though it were a childish habit or 
a survival from less sophisticated times, we should boldly admit the practice and commend 
ourselves for it. For anthropomorphising makes a lot of sense. It is the key to much of our 
success in coping with the world.  As Guthrie puts it: 
... we anthropomorphize because guessing that the world is humanlike is a good bet.  It is a bet 
because the world is uncertain, ambiguous, and in need of interpretation.  It is a good bet 
because the most valuable interpretations usually are those that disclose the presence of 
whatever is most important to us.  That usually is other humans.  
(Guthrie 1993:3)     
As highly accomplished meaning-makers (the most intelligent beings in the universe, as far 
as we know), we crave significance in the world around us appropriate to our own level of 
sophistication. And we inevitably interpret in terms of our personal interests (whether 
consciously or unconsciously) every experience that comes our way. Using research findings 
from everyday life, and from psychology, ethnography, the creative arts, philosophy and 
science, Guthrie shows how natural, universal and fruitful this tendency to 
anthropomorphise is. Through it, we maximise our ability to grasp the things that matter 
most to us. 
Scanning the world for humans and humanlike things and events, we find apparent instances 
everywhere.  We later judge many of these interpretations mistaken, but those that are correct 
more than justify the strategy.  Because betting on the most significant interpretations is 
deeply rooted, anthropomorphism is spontaneous, plausible, and even compelling. 
(Guthrie 1993: 3) 
When it comes to religion, Guthrie recognises that Tylor’s animistic theory is not currently 
fashionable in scholarly circles.  It has been criticised as making religion seem too rational 
and intellectualist, and is much less popular than two other main kinds of approach. 
 
First, there are irrationalist theories, according to which religion represents wish-fulfilment, 
fantasy or projection, brought on by human anxiety, alienation or illusions. (Examples of 
theorists proposing this view are Hume, Feuerbach, Marx, Malinowski and Freud.) 
 
Secondly, there are ‘social functionalist’ theories, which hold that religion is to be 
understood in terms of its rôle as symbolising and undergirding the social order.  Many 
scholars have included aspects of this view in their thought – above all Emile Durkheim.  
Guthrie draws attention to various limitations of these more fashionable theories, and sets 
out to reinstate the animistic approach, augmenting it with his own account of anthropo-
morphism as a general human cognitive strategy. 
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It is no news, of course, that religion contains anthropomorphism.  This has been pointed 
out again and again, since the Greek writer Xenophanes (c.390 BCE) observed wryly that 
animals also, if they could draw, would each depict its gods with its own species’ 
characteristics.  So anthropomorphising of the divine by humans, he implies, is just what one 
would expect, and hardly a reliable guide to the truth of the matter. 
 
For Guthrie, however, anthropomorphism is not merely typical of religion, it actually 
explains the religious enterprise itself, offering a coherent, rational account of its sources 
and its workings.  In his theory, anthropomorphism is what religion essentially is.  (In this 
respect, his theory resembles more the proposal of another Greek theorist, Euhemerus 
(c.330-260 BCE): that popular religion arises through the veneration of heroic ancestors 
who, after their deaths, are raised to the status of gods.) 
Theologians and many others find anthropomorphism inevitable in, yet inessential to, religion. 
They see it as an unfortunate limitation of human thought and peripheral to religious 
experience. In contrast, I hold that anthropomorphism is the core of religious experience. I 
claim that anthropomorphism springs from a powerful strategy and pervades human thought 
and action, and that religion is its most systematic form. 
(Guthrie 1993: 7) 
What makes religion centrally anthropomorphic is that all religions, in Guthrie’s view, have 
gods or a god, a personalised superhuman being or agent with whom human persons relate 
in worship and other forms of symbolic interaction.  Even Buddhism, often portrayed in the 
West as atheistic, can be fitted within Guthrie’s generalisation, since the Buddha is 
commonly personalised and given numerous superhuman powers, and is usually 
accompanied by various lesser divinities (Guthrie 1993: 19-20). 
 
To justify his claim that religion is essentially anthropomorphic, Guthrie has to discount the 
more mystical and self-transcending elements of many traditions of faith.  Some 
independent-minded or sophisticated thinkers in most faiths have criticised their tradition’s 
anthropomorphism and tried to move beyond it in their own expressions of belief. Those 
who have had intense visionary or mystical experiences of ‘that which is beyond’, for 
instance, have commonly expressed dissatisfaction with words or images drawn from the 
human, temporal domain, in trying to describe their encounters.  Some have even said that 
God or ‘the absolute’ should be given no positive attributes at all. 
 
But if such a via negativa (saying only what God is not) were all that there was in a religion, 
there would be no point in human beings following it, Guthrie argues.  The via negativa and 
other attempts to get beyond the anthropomorphic, in other words, continue to presuppose 
a belief in something with which humans can as-it-were-humanly interact. That, says 
Guthrie, inevitably involves anthropomorphism. 
 
Despite the attempts of some religious philosophies and theologies to transcend 
anthropomorphism, then, it is not something religions can readily shrug off. Any solid notion 
of gods or other spiritual agencies presupposes it. Sacred scriptures, folklore and popular 
piety are full of it. And religion itself, to have any living application and personal appeal in 
practice, cannot get along without humanly-construed relationships, goals, values and 






Is Anthropomorphism Wrong? 
To keep it interesting, the modern study of religion needs lucid and original theories such as 
Guthrie’s.  Some criticism, no doubt, could be made of the fact that he leaves little room for 
important non-personal systems and principles: cosmic law, karma and re-birth, yin/yang 
dualism, fate and destiny and the like.  Astrological charts and zodiacs, systems of number 
and word-symbolism, laws of alchemy and geomancy, techniques of divination and 
prophecy based on randomised events (dice, arrows, stones, etc) have a long history of 
magical and religious usage. Few of these are as personalised or animistic as the examples 
on which Guthrie relies; indeed, their power commonly lies in the fact that they operate 
regardless of personal values or intentions.  So, even though Guthrie is right to focus on the 
general humanising tendency in religion, the many non-animistic and non-anthropomorphic 
sources of religious significance make questionable his attempt to define religion as 
essentially anthropomorphic. 
 
What makes Guthrie’s approach most useful for our purposes, however, is not so much the 
success or otherwise of his claim that anthropomorphism explains religion, but rather his 
reminder that religion is essentially tied to human interests and concerns. Religion’s 
importance for humans, to put it crudely, lies in what they can get out of it. A religion, 
whether blatantly anthropomorphic or sublimely mystical, offers itself as humanly 
worthwhile for its participants. If it did not, there would be no point in following it. 
 
Guthrie’s emphasis on anthropomorphism also usefully highlights the fact that one very 
important way (though not, as he seems to imply, the only way) by which humans recognise 
things they believe to be valuable to them, and seek to establish fruitful relations with those 
things, is by personalising them. It is this, I shall argue, that provides the key to 
understanding the rôle of personally-conceived spirits and gods, the animism and anthropo-
morphism which, as Guthrie has shown, seems to play a central part in religions of all kinds. 
Yet anthropomorphism, Guthrie says, like animism, is a mistake – albeit an intelligent and 
excusable one. The perceptual strategy of ‘betting’ on human significance pays off so 
successfully sometimes that its failings at other times do not seriously discredit it. In 
successful cases, of course, we no longer speak of our personalising as anthropomorphism 
(or animism) for it is here the real thing.  But in others our addiction to anthropomorphising 
can and does lead us astray.  Guthrie writes: 
Anthropomorphism (towards animals or anything else) by definition is an overestimate of 
likeness. It is not simply an assumption of likeness since, in fact, many things are like us in 
various ways. It is a mistake about likeness. We can label it anthropomorphism only after 
seeing it as an error. 
(Guthrie 1993: 183) 
Candidly facing up to the question whether he thinks religion, as essentially 
anthropomorphic, must thereby be deemed in error, he admits: 
The central religious assertion, that the nonhuman world is, in whole or in part, significantly 
humanlike, seems mistaken. 
(Guthrie 1993: 200) 
His conviction about the rightness of that conclusion is strengthened, he says, by ‘the 
breadth and depth of anthropomorphism’ (i.e. mistaken personalisation) elsewhere in 
human thought. 
 
Here I think Guthrie has over-extended himself. He has claimed that the reason for 
anthropomorphising is the ambiguity and uncertainty of much of life.  Yet he has decided 
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himself that ‘the non human world’ is sufficiently unambiguous for him to reach the 
conclusion that religion is, after all, in error. How could he have reached such a judgement? 
Is it a conclusion which others are bound to accept too? 
 
The difficulty lies in Guthrie’s assumption that the rôle of anthropomorphism in religion is 
primarily a cognitive, perceptual one; that we anthropomorphise in order to try to correctly 
perceive some reality, to try to depict some state of affairs more or less accurately. If that is 
what we do, then the rightness or wrongness of our perception or depiction would seem to 
be the main question at issue. But things are not so straightforward. 
 
If we look at religions along the lines of Tylor’s and Guthrie’s animistic theories, we will tend 
to think the most important question to be asked about them is: ‘Do spirits exist?’  If we are 
persuaded that they do, then religion will be justified; its innate personalism will no longer 
be animistic or anthropomorphic, but real perception and true depiction.  If we decide spirits 
do not exist, then religion will be shown to be essentially a mistake, its animism unjustified 
and its anthropomorphism simply wrong. 
 
But an over-emphasis on the cognitive, fact-finding rôle of anthropomorphising in religion 
fails to take account of everything else that is going on too;  the living context, the personal 
and social setting of practice and usage, within which notions like ‘perception’ and ‘cognitive 
significance’ must themselves be interpreted.  Religion, as I have said, is not simply rational, 
interrogative and cognitive; it is also pragmatic, affective, expressive and instrumental.  It 
aims not just to achieve some superior kind of knowledge by personalising nature, the 
world, or life itself, but to extract superior values by doing so, and thereby to enrich the 
knower and serve their higher interests. 
 
Guthrie seems to assume that the rightness or wrongness of anthropomorphism is 
something that can be assessed from some non-religious non-personalised standpoint.  But 
can we stand outside religion and take a look at things in general – things in themselves, as it 
were – to decide whether or not religion is getting it right?  Where is this external point, this 
neutral ground, from which such judgements can be made? Here we encounter the 
problems raised by post-modernist critics, about the generalised, contextless assumptions of 
modern thought. 
 
Questions like ‘Is anthropomorphising wrong?’, ‘Do spirits exist?’ and the like cannot usefully 
be asked in the abstract. They have no clear meaning until we can find out a great deal more 
about what religious people do about the spirits they seem to be talking or thinking about.  
What difference does believing in spirits actually make to people’s lives, attitudes, feelings 
and behaviour? To appreciate these matters, we must look beneath general theories, 
doctrines and abstract theologies, to particular usage and practice, to religion in the applied 
rather than in the pure mode.  A case study later in this paper will give us an opportunity to 
do so.  To help prepare us to undertake this more practice-centred approach, I shall begin by 
setting the subject of spirits within the wider area of talk about the supernatural. 
 
 
Spirits and the Supernatural 
Educated people nowadays are mostly reluctant to speak about the supernatural for fear of 
seeming unscientific, over-religious, or a bit odd.  Sociologists and opinion pollsters tell us, 
however, that by far the majority of people in modern Western societies still admit to beliefs 
in the supernatural of one kind or another (Gallup & Castelli 1989). 
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What are these beliefs?  Most commonly, they include God, in some fairly unspecific sense 
(there are still only a small minority of atheists) but much more besides. As bookshop 
shelves and popular magazines show, interest still flourishes in astrology, clairvoyance and 
ESP (extra-sensory perception), mediumship and spirit-possession, reincarnation, and 
healing or other powers resulting from occult knowledge or meditation practices.  Likewise 
witchcraft and magic, hidden forces of good and evil, and alien beings from other galaxies 
and dimensions, feature prominently in popular fiction and entertainment. (They lend 
themselves especially well to computerised animation for comic books and video games, 
and can make visually stunning special effects in film and television.) Though no doubt taken 
only half-seriously by most educated adults, all this contemporary popular supernaturalism 
shows how much people in our supposedly scientific, technically advanced society still like to 
imagine fantastic possibilities and bizarre alternatives to the natural world of everyday life. 
 
Mainstream religious (i.e. Christian) opinion in the Western world reflects a deep-seated 
ambivalence when faced with the public’s continued fascination with the mysterious and 
out-of-this-world.  On the one hand, the Church wants there to be enough openness to the 
supernatural to keep traditional Christian beliefs afloat, so to speak; but, on the other, it has 
no desire at all to see modern society awash with what it regards as superstition and 
occultism. 
 
As well as belief in God, of course, there are many forms of popular supernaturalism to be 
found in the Christian Bible itself:  prophecy and prediction, dreams and visions, signs, 
portents and miracles abound in the Old Testament stories.  And in the New Testament the 
narratives concerning Jesus, the apostles and the early Church relate event after event of a 
supernatural kind:  dreams, visitations by angels, voices from heaven, exorcisms and 
miraculous healings, feeding of crowds, stilling of storms and walking on water, turning 
water into wine, resurrection of the dead.  But the Bible has its own clear criterion regarding 
the occult and the supernatural.  That which relates to God and his purposes is approved but 
all else is of the devil as it attracts the wickedness of idolatry and the folly of false worship.  
The Bible has no time for any rival religion. 
 
Thus freelance supernaturalism such as astrology, fortune-telling and divination, spiritualism 
and mediumship, occultism and magic have been sternly opposed by the Church’s leaders. 
Folk magic and supernaturalism within the Christian tradition has been approved of, 
however, when focused on images of the Virgin Mary, relics and shrines of patron saints and 
holy martyrs, or shown in such things as the blessing of land and crops and the use of 
crosses as charms and amulets.  Despite the Protestant reformers’ dislike for such things, 
they have characterised most popular Christianity right throughout its history.  Thus the 
Church has had plenty of its own miracles and magic, but has always been suspicious of 
supernaturalism engaged in by others (Thomas 1971;  Brown 1981). 
 
Since the middle of the 20th century the renewed emphasis by Pentecostal or charismatic 
Christian movements on gifts of the Spirit (speaking in tongues, prophecy, spiritual healing, 
exorcisms and the like) as part of the Church’s own heritage has created wide controversy, 
with various denominations differing sharply over whether such supernatural experiences 
and phenomena are to be encouraged or not. More recently still, the deeply engrained 
Christian attitude of ‘those who are not for us are against us’ has re-emerged in the strong 
condemnation (particularly by fundamentalist and evangelical Christians) of the now thriving 
New Age and neo-pagan supernaturalism. This movement, with its spectacular array of 
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unorthodox beliefs and alternative spiritual practices, is enthusiastically promoted by a wide 
range of spokespeople who are often colourful or prominent enough to find a ready 
audience in the popular broadcast media, and a readership in the flourishing magazine 
market.  It is not surprising that Church authorities should regard such a movement as a 
serious competitive threat.  More than that, it is seen as a momentous spiritual challenge. 
 
Just as popular bookshops stock more and more books and magazines on New Age topics, 
Christian publishers distribute a growing number of anti-New Age titles. Conservative 
Christian writers on this subject see New Age thought as an unholy mix of ancient occultism, 
neo-spiritualism, humanism and Eastern religions. Without a doubt, they believe it 
represents the work of Satan who, from the very first, has tempted human beings to follow 
paths other than the way of God.  Proving the truth of this view (mostly by reference to the 
Bible), and warning Christians off the whole business, has become a major preoccupation of 
some contemporary Christian writers and preachers. 
 
Not being bound to adopt the Christian Church’s exclusive stance, the general student of 
religion is free to take a less prejudiced interest in the things New Agers talk about: ESP, 
dreams and precognition, spiritual healing, mediumship, yoga and meditation and the like.  
This is not to say that students of religion will necessarily want to regard such things with 
great enthusiasm, or believe all they read about them.  On the contrary, they will be well 
aware of the high probability of self-deception, wishful thinking and fraud, in those areas of 
life in which people are particularly vulnerable: concerns about health and sickness, fantasy 
and fascination with mystery, insecurity, powerlessness and fear of death. 
 
Some observers have noted that much New Age thought is commercialised and consumer-
packaged, and many of its leaders and organisations reflect patriarchal and hierarchical 
attitudes very much like those which women are coming to find so offensive in Christianity 
and other religions. New Age spirituality thus seems a very mixed bag, and intelligent people 
seeking a faith for today might or might not find much of real worth in it. 
 
The student of religion, however, will want to keep an open mind about the more 
interesting claims made for the supernatural today, particularly such things as meditation, 
mystical experience and psychical phenomena. The faiths of the world are full of these 
things, after all.  And, like folk medicines and alternative therapies, some may well turn out 
to be reliable and beneficial, so all are worth considering on their merits. Once again, the 
subject calls for a pragmatic rather than a merely theoretical or ideological approach. But 
the general notion of the supernatural itself stands in need of some major clarification 
before we can proceed further. 
 
 
‘The Supernatural’ – Two Main Senses 
When an event, experience or state of affairs is spoken of as supernatural, two quite 
different things can be taking place; it may be being explained; or it may be being evaluated. 
In many cases, of course, both will be going on together. To explain something by referring 
to a supernatural source, cause or purpose involves going beyond normal explanations 
drawn from our knowledge of the natural and the ordinary.  Here, supernatural things are 
things ‘out of this world’. To believe that they are supernatural is to believe that they are the 
product of powers, realities or influences over and above those we know through our 




Evaluative responses to things that happen in our lives may also lead us to speak of the 
supernatural.  Here ‘supernatural’ keeps company with words like ‘amazing’, ‘awesome’, 
‘extraordinary’, ‘wonderful’ and so on. In particular, referring to something as supernatural 
shows a certain kind of religiously significant attitude: an inclination to regard that thing as 
valuable or worthy, and to act towards it in ways we might call worshipful. 
 
Now this dual function (evaluation and explanation) is not at all unusual with words. 
Consider, for instance, the way we use ‘natural’ itself. ‘Natural’ generally carries a positive 
evaluation.  We use it to say that something is normal, proper, to be expected or even to be 
welcomed as healthy and desirable. Since it is natural (the advertisements say), it must be 
good for us. Nowadays we feel (mostly) happy about the natural – though occasionally we 
contrast it with the civilised or the cultivated:  ‘Left to itself, the garden will quickly revert to 
its natural state’, we might say disapprovingly. 
 
At the same time, natural also has an explanatory use.  It means taking place according to 
known laws of nature; not being unexplained, mysterious or needing any special hidden 
forces or realities to account for it.  Thus when we hear reports of odd events like 
unidentified flying objects, unusual animal behaviour such as whale strandings, or peculiar 
circles appearing in fields of corn, our first thought will be to seek natural explanations.  To 
be natural is to be explainable, more or less, by what we already know. 
 
When we turn to the word supernatural we find a quite flexible connection between the 
explanatory and the evaluative uses. In the Biblical and Christian traditions especially, 
interest focuses far more on the evaluative than the explanatory aspects of the 
supernatural.  Explanation is taken care of because the religion as a whole rests on belief in a 
God who creates and upholds the universe. It can be simply assumed that God is the 
ultimate explanation of everything in general, as well as being part-cause of things that 
happen in particular. (Even the devil and his fallen angels are ultimately explained by God, 
who created them and allowed them the freedom to rebel.) 
 
Within the context of most mainstream Christian religious language (particularly the 
language of the Bible), references to the supernatural in an explanatory sense are hardly 
ever to be found. For Christianity already takes it for granted that God’s being a reality 
provides all the explanation that is needed, for anything else, whether ordinary or 
extraordinary. Thus you will not find in Christianity any effort being made to prove that the 
supernatural exists or is real. The Church, like the Bible, has other matters on its mind.  Its 
main concern is not with explaining amazing or wonderful things, but with cultivating the 
right and proper responses to them:  thanksgiving, love, praise, obedience to God and the 
like. In other words, all the attention is on right evaluation in practice: showing worship 
(recognising worth and responding appropriately to it), feeling awe and wonder, drawing 
power and regeneration from the worshipful relationship, and so on. 
 
Explanatory beliefs about how a particular event or experience has come about (the 
mechanics of the supernatural, we might say) is not thought of, in the Bible, as nearly as 
important as evaluative questions such as what to make of it and how to learn from its 
occurrence (its meaning in practice, for salvation, devotion, faith and the like). 
 
The reason why the Bible, and the Church following it, are so opposed to magic, spiritualism 
and the occult is that these kinds of supernaturalism seem to offer people the power to 
achieve some goal which does not involve them in worship or faith in God. The supernatural, 
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when it is not specifically worshipful in the approved form, is seen as a misguided, go-it-
alone activity. Therefore, it is felt, it cannot be conducive to a genuine saving faith and a 
right relation with God.  Instead, it leads people astray. 
 
Now Christianity is not alone in this concern. Other world religions too have found it 
necessary to rule out too much of the wrong sort of supernaturalism. The Buddha, for 
instance, while recognising that common folk relied widely on the low arts (magic, 
mediumship, spiritualism and so on), taught that such things, despite being real forms of 
supernatural power, are better avoided. For they are not aids to following the path to 
enlightenment but rather are obstacles, their practice arising from self-interest rather than 
from the selflessness which leads to true liberation and enlightenment. The main objection 
by Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism or the other established religions towards freelance do-
it-yourself supernaturalism, private occultism or esoteric magic and mysticism is that such 
things are bad practice. They don’t deliver the real goods;  they are an unreliable investment 
and a waste of time. It is not so much that they are mistaken as that they are unhelpful and 
inferior ways, which lead people astray or put them in bad company. 
 
The dispute between traditional religions and freelance magic and occultism, in other words, 
is best thought of not as a difference of opinion about supernatural explanations of how the 
universe works at some metaphysical level (even though disputes may commonly have been 
portrayed in  that form by intellectualising scholars). It is more fundamentally a dispute 
about values, about what goods are really worthwhile for humans, and about what ways and 
means in practice are most reliable for obtaining them. 
 
 
From Spirits to Spirituality 
The contrast we need to make clear is between talking about spirits or the supernatural as a 
special kind of explanation (a more-than-ordinarily-scientific, beyond-the-natural-world 
one), and talking that way in order to help express and put into practice a special kind of 
evaluation.  The difference stands out strikingly when we compare (a) arguing over whether 
or not gods, angels, spirits and the like actually exist, with (b) exploring, with well-informed 
empathy, the values and practices of a particular spirituality. 
 
An individual’s or a people’s spirituality refers to the things most precious to them, their 
inner sources of self-worth and identity, their valued personal goals and ideals, or their 
shared cultural treasures.  The word ‘spirituality’ nowadays has more appeal for many than 
‘religion’, with its reminders of institutions, dogmas, bigotry, fanaticism and so on.  But 
spirituality in the sense of piety, devotion and commitment has a long-established meaning 
within living religion itself, bringing out evaluative overtones of worth, benefit and 
importance in terms of the deepest human needs and interests. 
 
Not only is spirituality an evaluative word but it is also an active, pragmatic, engaged word. 
When we speak of spirituality we are thinking not merely of theoretical beliefs about 
invisible entities or states of affairs in some realm beyond time and space or in some life to 
come.  Such ideas of course are not irrelevant to spirituality.  They may indeed be present in 
the talk and imagery used to express a certain spirituality, and people may well say they 
‘believe in’ such things. But when it is their spirituality and not simply their beliefs we are 
seeking, we look primarily at what people hold precious in their lives, what goals they are 
seeking through religious devotion and piety, what values they are discovering in their 
experiences of faith and service, and so on.  Beliefs, of a theoretical and explanatory kind, lie 
well in the background. 
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When we turn in particular to animistic and anthropomorphic ideas such as spirits, people’s 
practice rather than their theories will be our chief source for understanding the significance 
of their beliefs. We will find this when we look, in the case study later in this paper, at the 
religious ‘cash value’ of the idea of spirits of ancestors. There we will find that, so far as 
actual practice is concerned, theoretical scientific-sounding questions like ‘Do ancestor 
spirits really exist?’ or ‘Is this particular instance of animistic anthropomorphising justified?’ 
do not have to be settled before the beliefs in question can be acted on or put to work.  
What matters religiously or spiritually to the practitioner is the spin-off of value, so to speak, 
the spirituality that goes with the beliefs in question, not their explanatory power.  It is the 
practice, not the theory, which carries most of the weight for a religion in real life. 
 
Now unless we take a pragmatic approach like that to a subject such as spirits or the 
supernatural, we will be diverted from religion into philosophy, metaphysics, 
parapsychology or some other kind of would-be science, in the hope that they will be able to 
decide ultimately mysterious questions for us. But then we will be faced with insoluble 
disputes from the very start: insoluble because there is nowhere we can turn to find out 
whether we have finished the task or not. For, unlike the case of simply physical objects 
which may or may not be present in a room, we have no ready-made decision procedures 
for settling the existence of non-material entities such as spirits are presumed to be. We do 
not even know where to begin in finding ways to settle them.  Similarly we have no agreed 
ways of settling questions like ‘Is there a supernatural realm?’ 
 
Here we might make a comparison between our interests in religion and our concerns about 
the weather. Few natural phenomena play anything like as important a part in our personal 
lives as the weather. Temperature and humidity affect our moods; bright skies lift our spirits; 
heavy clouds threaten or bring the promise of refreshing rain. Storms thrill or frighten us, 
floods endanger our lives and homes. Winds soothe or chill us, make us playful, or drive us 
to despair. In its dealings with us the weather lends itself to personalisation in many ways, 
even today when there are few who speak of gods of storm and thunder, nymphs and 
goddesses of the seasonal breezes or the sweet-smelling air from hills or sea. 
 
Our personalising of the weather expresses its intimate impact on us as human beings.  We 
are not scientifically explaining the weather when we personalise or anthropomorphise: we 
are valuing and responding to it. Scientific theorising is quite a different matter. Current 
meteorological theories and concepts help us to understand the laws governing the weather 
and, as a result, hopefully to make our predictions more and more reliable. Yet scientific 
theories change.  The terms and concepts used nowadays (isobars, anticyclones, and so on) 
have only been in use for a century or so, and will no doubt alter in the future as new ways 
of understanding chaotic or non-linear systems like the earth’s atmosphere are developed.  
Current theories may well be replaced by simpler or more elaborate ones, allowing better 
explanations and more reliable predictions to be made. 
 
So are our present-day meteorological theories true in any ultimate sense?  Who knows? Yet 
we don’t have to settle that question before we can carry on the practical everyday business 
of relating ourselves humanly to the weather, making roughly reliable (for our purposes) 
readings of its patterns, and responding in words, imagery and actions to its many influences 
on our moods, our ecology, agriculture and livelihood, our travel arrangements and 
recreations, our architecture, disaster relief plans and so on. 
 
Like our everyday words and thoughts about the weather, then, our practical spirituality and 
living religion may work perfectly well within the contexts of day-to-day life, regardless of 
the fact that would-be scientific, theoretical or metaphysical questions asked outside those 
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contexts receive conflicting answers from those who claim expertise on such matters, and 
may even turn out to be permanently unanswerable. 
 
Religion in practice, after all, is about recognising and obtaining value in life and responding 
to it in our actions and experience. In the West particularly, philosophers, metaphysicians 
and some theologians have portrayed religion as being primarily an explanatory super-
scientific matter, dealing with questions about various transcendent realities and their 
supposed relationships with the natural world. 
 
They are not entirely wrong to have done so for, if those kinds of question could be 
definitely settled, it might have a considerable bearing on the continuation of the religious 
practices involved.  But, owing to the nature of the questions themselves (‘Do spirits exist?’, 
‘Is there a god?’, ‘Can humans live again in a future life?’ and so on), there is very little 
likelihood of definitive answers being found at any one time and thereafter locked into all 
future knowledge. They are eternally elusive questions, always seeming to be able to 
reappear even when supposedly conclusive answers have been given to them in any 
particular culture or civilisation 
 
Thus living religion is free to continue in its evaluative, pragmatic rôle in human lives, 
without the validity of its values and practices being held permanently hostage to the quest 
for ultimate answers or explanations of a metaphysical kind. By moving the discussion of 
issues like the existence of such-and-such spirits away from some ideal universal 
metaphysics or super-science and towards particular questions about the values implicit in 
such-and-such a spirituality, we escape from a theoretical treadmill and bring ourselves 
closer to what goes on in practice, where the real core of religion is to be found. 
 
 
Spirituality as Personalised Value 
When it comes to finding significance, personalising maximises our chances.  As Guthrie puts 
it: 
... comforting or frightening, a humanlike model yields greater significance than does any 
other. Because humans habitually look for meaning, interpretations with more meaning (that 
is, more information) are better than those with less ... 
(Guthrie 1993: 77-8) 
For Guthrie, personalising is primarily a strategy of perception or cognition (a theory-serving 
explanatory matter). I have argued in the previous section, however, that in living religion 
and spirituality, personalising may play only a minor rôle at the theoretical and explanatory 
level.  It is in value-finding, motivating, stimulating experience, imagination and action at the 
practical level, that it comes into its own.  Personal values, after all, are the highest we have, 
so personalised spiritualities can promise to be the most intensified sources of worth we can 
know.  In evaluative terms, personalness seems to be the highest, most truly supernatural 
reality in the world. 
 
To say that the personal is the true supernatural is more than just playing with words. The 
point can be brought out best by attempting a simple action: namely, reaching out one’s 
hand and touching another person. Naturally speaking, we are physical objects, material 
bodies in time and space which from time to time come into contact with other bodies. Yet 
it is a very different matter when we consciously (that is, as persons) make contact with the 
body of another person. We are no longer in the world of the merely physical. Something 
significantly different is added – even though, because it is natural to us as persons, we 
usually take it entirely for granted. 
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What makes personal contact different?  Why is something special brought into the picture 
when we touch somebody else?  There is more to this than mere social conventions of 
acceptable behaviour, though these are revealing in themselves since they hardly apply at all 
to non-personal objects or bodies. The point is that even to speak of our consciously 
touching another person is to use terms and concepts for which our existence as persons is 
primary. There is a distinct logical category implied by the statement itself, quite 
inapplicable to objects other than persons.  Person-talk is in a world of its own. 
 
In terms of our modern knowledge, however, many would think persons must be of trivial 
significance.  And, as the immense age and apparently boundless extent of the universe have 
come to be appreciated, to continue to hold traditional religious ideas of something 
resembling a human person as ultimately responsible for everything might seem to go from 
childishness to absurdity bordering on the insane. 
 
But in recent times not only philosophers but physicists and cosmologists too have 
combined to bring to our notice again just how significant, for the whole universe, is our 
personal point of view. Thus mathematical physicist and popular writer Paul Davies 
concludes a recent book with the words: 
I cannot believe that our existence in this universe is a mere quirk of fate, an accident of 
history, an incidental blip in the great cosmic drama.  Our involvement is too intimate.  The 
physical species Homo may count for nothing, but the existence of mind in some organism on 
some planet in the universe is surely a fact of fundamental significance.  Through conscious 
beings the universe has generated self-awareness.  This can be no trivial detail, no minor 
byproduct of mindless, purposeless forces.  We are truly meant to be here.   
(Davies 1992: 232) 
Davies reaches his conclusion by traversing the story of cosmic evolution as it can now be 
told with the help of cosmology, astrophysics and molecular biology. It is the most 
comprehensive evolutionary story that can ever be imagined, from Big Bang to you and me.  
The whole universe, it turns out, has gone into the making of every individual person.  And it 
appears to be finely balanced at many crucial points, like a castle made with cards, in just 
the ways that are needed if the evolution of persons like ourselves is sooner or later to 
become a real possibility.  Of course we would not be here if it were otherwise.  But the fact 
is that we are here. 
 
Now Guthrie’s approach to such anthropic [human centred] thinking is to dismiss it as a 
glaring modern example of our continuing tendency to anthropomorphise. Thus he says: 
Anthropists see the universe as designed and humans as central to it. The medley of arguments 
for anthropism, and the medley of anthropisms, seem impelled by the same unconscious, 
strategic, perceptual practice we have seen at work elsewhere.  At best, anthropism appears an 
uneasy union of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, elevated to a principle. 
(Guthrie 1993: 170) 
 
But to dismiss the current anthropic or personalised cosmological views as unscientific is to 
think only of their strictly explanatory aspect and to miss the evaluation involved.  Popular 
cosmologists like Davies personalise the universe because they are amazed by it and love it, 
and want to help their readers to do so too.  They do this not just from a romantic urge or 
fancy.  It is because the more they find out about it, the more our own personal values seem 
to be bound up with it.  They are able to show us that we are the universe’s children, its 
highest offspring, in an increasingly remarkable sense. 
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For it is in human beings – uniquely, so far as we know – that this universe has evolved to 
the state of becoming not only conscious of itself but sufficiently intelligent to measure, 
interpret and construct working theories about its own laws and inner workings.  It is we 
above all who extract value from the universe.  Thus we are, as persons, both born of nature 
and also nature-transcending beings.  To realise this is to begin to grasp the specialness of 
our seemingly unique personal status and viewpoint.  It makes more intelligible, likewise, 
the real nature of the supernaturalism of traditional religious cosmologies:  that is, the ways 
in which their values, mythologies, systems of salvation and devotional paths sought to 
convey and underwrite, by one means or another, the message that personal values are 
supreme. 
 
The contemporary movement away from impersonal scientific explanation as having the last 
word, towards more personalised evaluative views – a movement that has been called ‘the 
new Animism’ (Sheldrake 1990) –  is well illustrated in another striking example of modern 
anthropomorphising, the so-called Gaia hypothesis of James Lovelock. This is the hypothesis 
that the entire earth is an organism and that all earth-based life can be thought of as 
... a single living entity, capable of manipulating the earth’s atmosphere to suit its overall needs 
and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts. 
(Guthrie 1993: 172) 
Guthrie dismisses this as unscientific, as just another example of mistaken 
anthropomorphism.  He comments: 
Although Lovelock has few followers among other scientists, his lay audience is broad and his 
notion is of ancient lineage.  Lovelock, his adherents, and even his critics, however, seem hardly 
aware of the antiquity of his idea. 
(Guthrie 1993: 172) 
 
The great appeal of Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, however, particularly among the lay 
audience Guthrie refers to, is not that it is scientifically compelling (that depends on 
currently inconclusive argument among specialists).  It is that it revives a traditional but long 
forgotten feeling about the world:  a feeling of love and wonder and responsibility; a feeling 
so strong that nothing less than personal terms and images can be found to express it.  This 
renewed form of spirituality, a re-awakening to the mystery and wonder of personal 
existence within a living universe, seems to explain the chief appeal of the Gaia hypothesis.  
There is much more to it than simply misguided, anthropomorphic science. 
 
The same may be said of other instances of resurgent animism:  for instance, the passionate 
commitment displayed in conservation or ecology movements, or the devotion and zealotry 
present in various movements for saving endangered species and protecting animal rights. 
All these examples from modern life show a contemporary animistic or anthropomorphic 
spirituality which is not bad science but which reclaims personalness and begins to extend it 
beyond humans to embrace animal life, the living systems of nature and the universe itself.  
The emphasis throughout is on an evaluative response, finding meanings, drawing 
enrichment, capturing worth and value, as humans participate in and respond to their wider 
environment in new or re-discovered ways.  At the heart of such spirituality is the practice of 
personalising the things found to be most valuable in life.  Recognising this can go a long way 
towards helping us understand the part played by ideas of gods, spirits and other super-





Spirits and Spirituality: Case Study 
In this case study we will draw our example of belief in spirits from the Melanesian people of 
the Solomon Islands in the South-West Pacific.  Dr Esau Tuza, a modern-day Solomon Island 
scholar of religion, reports on his research amongst older members of his own people: 
Returning to the realm of the ‘old’ days, I viewed with interest seven old photographs of 
traditional shrines decorated with human bones and skulls. I once lived within the areas of 
these shrines and later visited a number of them, some as recently as 1977.  I asked myself the 
question, ‘What actually happened in these places?’ 
(Tuza 1979: 97) 
In response to the question ‘What did you do and say when you performed rituals in the 
“skull houses”?’, his informants replied: 
We presented puddings, first fruits and pigs to the recent dead in their memory.  We recalled 
their names, their great deeds and how they were recognised when they were still alive.  
Because of this, we invoke them so that their spirits will keep on protecting the living. 
(Tuza 1979: 97) 
 
According to Tylor’s and Guthrie’s ‘intellectualist’ theories, belief in spirits comes first 
(through animism or misplaced anthropomorphism) then, as a consequence of that belief, 
ritual and worship follow. But, as Tuza illustrates in this case, it makes little sense to talk 
about the spirits as distinct from the religious worship or spiritual practice.  The two are inti-
mately, even logically, connected.  For it is within the practice, the spirituality itself, that the 
spirits are identified as those particular ancestors, and clothed with the religious significance 
they have for the living.  Tuza writes: 
With the skull houses (sope), the memory is engraved both in symbol and in thanksgiving.  
Skulls, human bones and certain material representations bring back to life that which people 
valued during a person’s lifetime. Since the deeds of a person’s life are worthy of recall to 
influence the living, puddings are made out of ngali nut and taro, first-fruits and pigs are given 
to him in his honour. This is ‘worship’ to the ancestor. 
However, worship as such is a two-way process. On the one hand, man has a need to give 
praise to what is considered worthy and heroic ... On the other hand, worship or praise is man’s 
constant response to what is constantly helpful and ideal in human situations. Hence, rituals 
are performed to highlight the continuing influence of good deeds among the living. 
(Tuza 1978: 98) 
Certain of the dead are honoured, then, by the valuing of their on-going ‘impact’ (as Tuza 
calls it) on the lives of the living, who share meals with them as meals are shared with 
distinguished living relatives. Recalling the status, mana or reputation of former family or 
clan members, and thus feeling the loss of their departure, the living express their anxiety by 
addressing prayers to them and calling on them for continued help. 
The sope is often built either on a hill or near a huge tree said to be inhabited by other powers.  
Such a location gives a sense of height, awe, wonderment, greatness and hence of worship. 
Worship involves the ‘recalling’ of ancestral mana to be operative among the living. This is 
done through sacrifice burnt at the door of the sope. When the fire begins to smoke, the 
recalling of past deeds commences ... recalling begins with the most recent dead and reaches 
back to distant ancestors, as far as memory can probe. (Tuza 1978: 106) 
 
These memorial rituals, with their accompanying social activities and shared emotions, are 
clearly rewarding in themselves.  Tuza reports the words of one of his informants, telling of 
the activity of building a particular sope or ritual spirit-house: 
Let us build a sope! we all said in agreement.  We went to wash our hands, we ate sumuku 
[protective herbal medicines, often chewed with betel nuts], we put on papaqala [traditional 
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necklaces]. Then the cone shell set aside for wisemen was blown ... After that we begin to 
work.  We sewed leaves together ... made roofs and completed the whole house. We sewed 
the leaves together for the walls and put them on.  After that we collected fish, yams, and taro 
which were set aside for worship purposes, started a fire and burnt them all at the door of the 
sope.  When all this was burnt up, cone shell was blown again and we made our way downhill.  
There at the foot of the hill we washed our hands again, broke our papaqala and threw them 
to the sea.  Finally we came home and ate a feast. I felt extremely good inside me. 
(Tuza 1987: 105) 
No doubt people in the Solomon Islands, as elsewhere, enjoy having an excuse for a feast.  
(Here it is puddings, first-fruits of the new season’s harvest, and pigs, a luxury source of 
protein, kept for very special occasions.)  Such occasions provide an opportunity for the 
ritual specialists (inevitably groups of adult males) to dress up in ceremonial finery and 
display their skills and prestige. 
 
The participants share in reminiscing about the dead, recalling what parents, husbands and 
wives, elder brothers and sisters meant to them when they were alive; how much they 
would like to have their help and guidance in the present.  They act out these feelings in 
rituals of food-offering, invocation and prayer. Generally, the people find their group 
relationships strengthened, and gain a sense of renewed identity and well-being from taking 
part. 
 
Such ancestor worship, then, takes place not simply as a consequence of the people’s 
holding a particular metaphysical or philosophical belief that ‘the ancestors live on as 
spirits’.  Instead, the practices can be seen as part of a complex set of activities which people 
like doing anyway:  i.e., practices which have their own rewards and benefits.  Many of the 
practices could quite well go on even if belief in spirits of the dead had never arisen.  On the 
other hand, unless it were carried along by some kind of ritual or practice, a mere belief in 
spirits might not amount to anything much at all.  Without actual practices and conventions 
of worship, we could hardly speak of those particular spirits as having any distinct identity or 
value.  They would be characterless and irrelevant. 
 
Thus the rituals, values and practices of the living – their spirituality in a word – effectively 
defines the spirits of the dead, personalising them as religiously-important beings.  They 
come alive, so to speak, in the images made to represent them, the stories told in their 
honour, the food shared with them and the gifts given, along with the expectations placed 
upon them for their continued influence for the well-being of the living. 
 
Is this all there is, then, to the existence of spirits?  Do they only exist insofar as people bring 
them to mind and perform various actions and practices on their behalf?  Indeed, are they 
simply imagined to exist, in order to add a richer context to the doing of certain things which 
people are inclined to do anyway – the spirits, as it were, providing a good excuse for having 
frequent feasts? 
 
It might be felt that we have looked at only half the picture, focusing on the evaluative, or 
value-enhancing, side of supernatural beliefs like the belief in spirits;  showing how much 
this is involved with the living here-and-now practices of a religion or spirituality.  But what 
about the explanatory side, the side which seems to offer knowledge of transcendent 
realities and powers? 
 
After all, aren’t ancestor spirits more than just valued icons, symbols of the good (or bad) 
things in family traditions and culture?  Aren’t they also believed to be living personalities 
and agents?  Are they not interactive realities and thus in an important sense different from 
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fictional or imagined realities, even granting that there is a measure of objectivity and power 
to such things? Can’t they answer prayers, arrange good harvests, and organise punishments 
for breaches of morality?  Can they not make their presence felt in dreams and visions, their 
voices heard through spirit-mediums and their wishes known through oracles and 
divination? 
 
All these things do indeed appear to be believed of their spirits by the Solomon Islanders.  
They take it for granted, apparently, that the ancestors, whose veneration and 
commemoration they find fruitful and rewarding, exist as supernatural beings in an 
explanatory objective sense.  Are they right or wrong in doing so?  Are their beliefs about 
the spirits actually true or false?  To help answer those questions, we might first consider 
whether we would be in any position to disagree with them, if we shared at first hand the 
same practices as they do, experienced the pull of the same spirituality and lived in the same 
personal and social life-worlds. 
 
‘Belief in spirits’, as a religious issue, is not a distinct theoretical question to be debated 
independently of a people’s spiritual practices.  It is tied up with the continued enjoyment 
and effectiveness of those practices themselves.  So long as people find it viable and 
rewarding to personalise things valuable to them in terms of ancestor spirits, the question 
‘But do the dead really live on?’ will not make much sense to them.  Into what other real 
world than their own are they expected to step, to be able to answer – or even ask – that 
question? 
 
And it is not at all clear where we can be expected to turn to find out what actually exists, 
independent of some particular living context of beliefs and practices.  At best, we can judge 
such matters according to our own views – but are we at all certain what these are, with 
regard to subjects like spirits of the dead?  And why should our society be particularly expert 
on the matter, it might be asked.  Do we care as much about our ancestors as the Solomon 
Islanders do?  If we did, perhaps our views about spirits would be different.  Does it matter, 
then, for spirituality, whether spirits actually exist or not?  After all, spirits might exist in 
reality yet be so irrelevant to human practice, values and interests that they were of no 
religious importance at all.  It is only when clothed in the spirituality of certain people’s 
actual practice, their worship, offerings, feasts and so on, that the deceased ancestors can 
have any effect on the living of a valuable, religiously-relevant kind. 
 
Human conceptions of what can and cannot happen, what really is the case and what is not, 
have changed a great deal down the centuries and will no doubt go on changing.  The 
prevailing opinion of secular academic and scientific opinion in the Western world that 
spirits do not exist, however confident it may be about its own rightness, is very much a 
minority view by world standards and is likely to continue to be so.  After all, disproving the 
existence of supernatural, invisible agencies in some form or another seems impossible.  
How do we ever know for certain what doesn’t exist? 
 
The idea that there might be a scientific proof or disproof of the existence of spirits or gods 
that would settle the question of religion for all time is a misguided quest.  Whether spirits 
exist scientifically is as irrelevant to spirituality as the question whether love or music exist 
scientifically is irrelevant to romance or concert-going. 
 
So, whatever the future of scientific thinking, there will continue to be ample opportunity 
for large majorities of the world’s peoples to rely on humanity’s long-standing habit of 
animism, anthropomorphism and personalisation — not so much as an explanatory theory 
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of extraordinary things, but as the best way they can find of preserving and enhancing the 
values they find mean most to them in practice:  values like continuity with their ancestors, 
solidarity with the powers of nature, and imaginative power and inspiration drawn from 
within their cultural traditions to help them face the future. 
 
What our case study has shown us is that, in a particular living context, the order of 
reasoning is not that ‘personal spirits of the dead exist, therefore it is worthwhile to worship 
them’.  It is closer to ‘personalised worship and spirituality focused on the ancestors is 




Spirits, spirituality, the supernatural ... these are powerful, intoxicating words, rich with 
flavours and associations, like strong drink or mysterious ancient potions.  When used today 
they can seem stale and unhealthy – or they can carry the promise of intriguing insights and 
profound new understandings. 
 
In this paper I have explored some of their interconnections, trying to show where they fit 
into our modern understandings of life and, more particularly, what they can mean for our 
experiences of religious belief and practice. 
 
The words still have their uses.  We may be thinking of ghosts and exorcisms, alien visitors or 
gremlins in technology.  We may have in mind tribal peoples’ longing for their ancestral 
homelands, the presence of the Holy Spirit in inter-faith dialogue, or the passion of nature-
lovers concerned for rainforests and animal species.  In all these cases and countless more 
we can still find value in talk about spirit, spirits and spirituality.  It can serve us well, so long 
as we remain informed and flexible in our understanding of it, and conscious that, however 
antiquated and elusive it may sometimes seem, it is not nonsense as it is rooted in the 
familiar practices and values of our lives as persons.  Animistic and anthropomorphic such 
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